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Abstract
We study an online model of fair division designed
to capture features of a real world charity problem.
We consider two simple mechanisms for this model
in which agents simply declare what items they
like. We analyse several axiomatic properties of
these mechanisms like strategy-proofness and envy
freeness. Finally, we perform a competitive analy-
sis and compute the price of anarchy.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation is a fundamental problem facing society.
How do we share scarce and often costly resources between
different parties? Due to environmental, economic and tech-
nological changes, there is an every increasing pressure on
the allocation of resources. The theoretical foundations of re-
source allocation have been developed using simple abstract
models. For example, one simple model for resource allo-
cation is fair division. Fair division problems are typically
categorised along several orthogonal dimensions: divisible or
indivisible goods, centralised or decentralised mechanisms,
cardinal or ordinal preferences, etc. (e.g. [Chevaleyre et al.,
2006]). However, such categories do not capture the richness
of many real world fair division problems. This has moti-
vated a call to develop more complex and realistic models
and mechanisms [Walsh, 2015]. In this paper, we respond to
this call by studying mechanisms for an online fair division
problem first proposed in [Walsh, 2014].
2 The Food Bank problem
Unfortunately, even in developed countries, poverty remains
a serious problem. For example, the 2012 report “Poverty In
Australia” estimated that over 2 million people (12.5% of the
population) are within the official definition of poverty (less
than half the median income) [Davidson, 2012]. Amongst
the young and old, the statistics are even worse (roughly 1
in 6 children, and 1 in 4 pensioners). These people struggle
to feed themselves and increasingly call upon food banks to
help. Food Bank Australia sees the demand on their services
increase by over 10% per annum. For this reason, they are
keen to improve the efficiency of their operations.
In cooperation with a social startup, FoodBank Local, we
have been helping Food Bank Australia develop technologies
to operate more effectively. So far, this has involved build-
ing an app to help collect and deliver donated food. This app
uses our vehicle routing solver to route their trucks. We are
now turning our attention to how the donated food is allo-
cated to different charities. This is an interesting fair divi-
sion problem. It has many traditional features. We want to
allocate food fairly between the different charities that feed
different sectors of the community. Goods are mostly indi-
visible. The allocation does not use money as these are all
charities. However, the problem also has other features not
traditionally found in the academic literature on fair division.
One of the main novelties is that it is online. Food is donated
throughout the day and we must start allocating and distribut-
ing it almost immediately, before we know what else will be
donated. We have therefore formulated an online model of
their fair division problem, and studied mechanisms that can
fairly and efficiently allocate the donated food.
3 Online fair division
We have k agents. Each agent has some (private) utility for
the m items. One of the m items appears at each time step,
and the allocation mechanism must assign it to one of the
agents. The next item is then revealed. This continues for m
steps. To allocate items in this online model, we consider a
simple class of bidding mechanisms in which agents merely
declare if they like items or not. For instance, the LIKE mech-
anism allocates the next item uniformly at random between
agents that declare that they like the item. An allocation is
a possible outcome of the LIKE mechanism if each item is
given to an agent that values it, whilst an allocation is the
necessary outcome if no two agents like the same item, and
each item is given to the agent that values it, or to no one if
no agent likes it.
One problem with the LIKE mechanism is that agents can
get unlucky. It is possible for them to bid for every item but
have every coin toss go against them and not be allocated
anything at all. This is highly undesirable in our Food Bank
setting. A whole sector of the population will then not be
fed that night. We therefore consider a slightly more so-
phisticated mechanism that helps tackle this problem. The
BALANCED LIKE mechanism tries to balance the number
of items allocated to agents compared to the LIKE mech-
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anism. It allocates the next item uniformly at random be-
tween those agents that value it that have so far received the
fewest items. The BALANCED LIKE mechanism is less likely
to leave agents empty handed than the LIKE mechanism. In
particular, an agent is guaranteed to be allocated at least one
item for every k items that they like. However, there is no
guarantee that it necessarily returns balanced allocations.
Given the order of items, we can compute the actual out-
come of both the LIKE and BALANCED LIKE mechanisms
efficiently. Each of the m steps takes O(k) time. Suppos-
ing agents bid sincerely, computing the probability an agent
gets a particular item, as well as their expected utility is more
challenging as there are O(km) possible outcomes. With the
LIKE mechanism, the probability that agent i gets item j is
simply 1/qj where qj is the number of agents who like j. The
expected utility is then
∑m
j=1
ui(j)
qj
where ui(j) is the pri-
vate utility of agent i for item j. With the BALANCED LIKE
mechanism, we can compute the probability that an agent gets
a particular item using dynamic programming. This exploits
the fact that the mechanism is Markovian. It doesn’t care how
we get to a particular state, just how many items each agent
has at this point. The states represent the number of items
allocated to each agent. We can compute the probability that
an agent gets a particular item, as well as the expected utility
of an agent in O(mk) space and time. Note that k is typically
smaller than m so O(mk) is likely better than O(km).
4 Strategy-proofness
As is common in the literature, we will consider the axiomatic
properties of these mechanisms. For example, we say that
a mechanism for online fair division is strategy-proof if and
only if, with knowledge of the items still to be revealed, the
order in which they will be revealed, and the private utilities
of the other agents, an agent cannot increase their expected
utility by bidding differently to their true preferences. We
might prefer strategy-proof mechanisms as agents cannot ma-
nipulate the outcome to improve their utility at the expense of
agents who are less sophisticated or knowledgeable.
Theorem 1 The LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof.
With the BALANCED LIKE mechanism, balancing the size
of the allocations has an unfortunate side effect: an agent can
now manipulate the outcome to increase their expected utility
by bidding strategically. In particular, an agent may choose
not to bid for an item now in the knowledge that this will bias
future allocation rounds in their favour. Such manipulations
may decrease the equitability of the final allocation.
Theorem 2 The BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not
strategy-proof even when restricted to 0/1 utilities.
Proof. Suppose we are allocating the items a, b and c in this
order between agents 1, 2 and 3 with agent 1 having utility
1 for all items, agent 2 for a and c, and agent 3 for b alone.
Then bidding sincerely gives agent 1 an expected utility of 98
but this can be increased to 54 if agent 1 strategically bids only
for items b and c supposing the other agents bid sincerely. 2
It is a strong assumption to suppose that a strategic agent
has full knowledge of the items still to be revealed, the or-
der in which they will be revealed, and the private utilities of
the agents for these items. In practice, agents may only have
partial knowledge. This will greatly limit the willingness of,
say, a risk averse agent to be strategic. For instance, if there
is a chance that only items that you do not value will arrive
in the future, a risk averse agent will always sincerely bid
for an item that arrives now which they value. Interestingly,
when limited to just two agents and bivalent utilities, the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism becomes strategy-proof even
under our strong assumption of complete knowledge.
Theorem 3 With only 2 agents and 0/1 utilities, the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof.
Proof. (Sketch) Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to
prove that truth-telling is the dominant strategy for agent 1.
The general idea of the proof is that we focus on the last item
that agent 1 misreported. We show that agent 1 does at least
as well or strictly better by expressing a preference in which
he does not misreport about this item. By induction, agent 1
does not have an incentive to misreport any item.
Consider any ordering of the items where in each round i,
item oi is allocated to either to agent 1, 2, or neither of them.
We want to show that agent 1 has no incentive to be untruth-
ful even if he is aware of the ordering beforehand. We view
the allocation process as an allocation tree as follows. A node
labelled (i, (x, y)) denotes a decision point in the allocation
process when the i-th item is allocated, x denotes the num-
ber of items already allocated to agent 1 and y denotes the
number of items already allocated to agent 2. Depending on
what allocation decision is taken from node (i, (x, y)), we ar-
rive at child node of (i, (x, y)), which is (i + 1, (x + 1, y)),
(i + 1, (x, y + 1)), or (i + 1, (x, y)), depending on whether
item oi is allocated to agent 1, agent 2, or neither of them.
Let T (i, (x, y)) be the allocation sub-tree tree starting from
a node at round i in which x items have been allocated to
agent 1 and y items have been allocated to agent 2. Let
U1(T (i, (x, y))) be the total expected utility for agent 1 start-
ing from the node (i, (x, y)) when agents report truthfully.
Observation 1 The allocation tree has the following
memory-less property: if there is a node v labelled (i, (x, y))
and a node v′ labelled (i, (x′, y′)) such that x− y = x′ − y′,
then the sub-trees rooted at v and v′ are identical, irrespec-
tive of how items were allocated previously.
The following lemmas can be proved by analysing the al-
location trees. The base cases i = m are trivial. For the
induction, we prove that if the statement holds for i+1 to m,
then it also holds for i.
Lemma 1 For any integers x and y, and for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
U1(T (i, (x, y))) ≥ U1(T (i, (x− 1, y + 1)))
Lemma 2 For any integers x and y, and for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
U1(T (i, (x, y))) ≥ U1(T (i, (x− 1, y)))
Lemma 3 For any integers x and y, and for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
U1(T (i, (x, y))) ≥ U1(T (i, (x, y + 1)))
Using these lemmas, we can prove that agent 1 has no in-
centive to misreport any item. Let u′1 denote agent 1’s insin-
cere bid, let oi denote the last item for which agent 1 does not
bid sincerely, and let u1 denote the bid obtained from u′1 by
voting sincerely for item oi. Let us further suppose that we
are at node (i, (x, y)) and u′1(oi) = 1 whilst u1(oi) = 0.
By Observation 1 and Lemma 3, there is no incentive for
agent 1 to approve an unapproved item. Therefore, assume
that agent 1 does not bid for an item he likes: u′1(oi) = 0 and
u1(oi) = 1. We focus on the node (i, (x, y)) which leads to
different subtrees depending on whether agent 1 reports u1 or
u′1.
• If agent 2 does not bid for oi, then agent 1 gets o1 for sure
under u1 but no one gets oi if agent 1 reports u′1. Under
u1 we arrive at a node labelled (i+1, (x+1, y)), whereas
under u′1 we arrive at a node labelled (i+ 1, (x, y)). By
Lemma 2, u1 yields at least as much utility as u′1 since
U1(T (i+ 1, (x+ 1, y))) ≥ U1(T (i+ 1, (x, y))).
• If agent 2 bids for oi and x < y, then agent 1 receives
item i under u1 and agent 2 receives the item under
u′1. Since, by Lemma 1, U1(T (i + 1, (x + 1, y))) ≥
U1(T (i, (x, y+1))), reporting u1 yields at least as much
utility to agent 1 as u′1.
• If agent 2 bids for oi and x = y, then under u1 there are
two children labeled (i+1, (x+1, y)) and (i+1, (x, y+
1)) of (i, (x, y)). But under u′1, there is only one child
(i+1, (x, y+1)) of (i, (x, y)). By Lemma 1, U1(T (i+
1, (x + 1, y))) ≥ U1(T (i + 1, (x, y + 1))) and thus u1
yields at least as much utility to agent 1 as u′1.
• Finally, if agent 2 bids for oi and x > y, then agent 2
receives item oi, no matter how agent 1 bids. Therefore,
agent 1 has no incentive to report u′1 rather than u1.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 2
Intuitively, one might hope that this theorem can be gen-
eralized to an arbitrary number of agents where each item
is valued by at most 2 agents. However, the example in the
proof of Theorem 2 shows that this is not possible, even for
3 agents. It is also easy to give examples with more gen-
eral utilities where the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not
strategy-proof even with 2 agents.
Example 1 Consider 2 agents and 2 items, a and b. Agent 1
has utility 12 for both items, and agent 2 has utility
1
4 for item
a and 34 for item b, normalized to sum up to 1. If agents bid
sincerely for both items, then agent 2 has an expected utility
of 12 . However, by bidding strategically only for item b, agent
2 can increase their expected utility to 34 . Agent 1 has no
incentive to bid strategically and receives the optimal utility
of 12 in both cases. In this case, strategic behaviour leaves
the egalitarian welfare unchanged, and actually increases the
overall utilitarian welfare.
5 Impact on welfare
Strategic play can have both a positive or negative effect on
welfare. We consider pure Nash equilibria in which no agent
can get strictly greater expected utility by changing their strat-
egy. Although the LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof, there
are pure Nash equilibria that have much smaller egalitarian
and utilitarian welfare than sincere play for both mechanisms.
Theorem 4 There are instances with 0/1 utilities and k
agents, where the egalitarian and utilitarian welfare of sin-
cere play in the LIKE and BALANCED LIKE is k times the
corresponding welfare of at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an instance with k agents and k items. For
each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, agent i values item i and no other item.
For sincere play, item i is assigned to agent i in both the LIKE
and BALANCED LIKE mechanisms, giving an egalitarian util-
ity of 1 and a utilitarian utility of k. Let us now consider the
pure Nash equilibrium where each agent bids for all items.
In the LIKE mechanism, with these bids, each agent is allo-
cated each item with probability 1/k. Since each agent val-
ues exactly one item, this gives an expected egalitarian wel-
fare of 1/k and an expected utilitarian welfare of 1. In the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism, each agent is allocated exactly
one item. The probability that this item is the one she likes is
1/k, giving again an expected egalitarian welfare of 1/k and
an expected utilitarian welfare of 1. 2
In the LIKE mechanism, a pure Nash equilibrium cannot
lead to greater egalitarian or utilitarian welfare than sincere
play as no player has an incentive to not bid for an item she
likes. The example in the last proof has many agents that bid
for items for which they have no value. Such bids do not hurt
an individual’s (expected) utility but neither do they help. We
will consider a subset of pure Nash equilibria by supposing
a small utility cost to liking (or taking delivery of) an item.
We call these simple pure Nash equilibria. Note that sincere
play is the only simple pure Nash equilibrium for the LIKE
mechanism, and therefore, there is no difference in welfare
between sincere play and simple pure Nash equilibria.
For the BALANCED LIKE mechanism, simple pure Nash
equilibria have the same utilitarian utility as sincere play, as
each item is assigned to an agent who likes it. However,
we will show that a simple pure Nash equilibrium may have
smaller or greater egalitarian utility than sincere play.
Theorem 5 There are instances with 0/1 utilities where
the expected egalitarian welfare of sincere play in the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism is strictly greater than the ex-
pected egalitarian welfare of each simple pure Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 gives an instance where the
unique simple pure Nash equilibrium has less expected egal-
itarian utility than sincere play. 2
Theorem 6 There are instances with 0/1 utilities where
the expected egalitarian welfare of sincere play in the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism is strictly smaller than the ex-
pected egalitarian welfare of each simple pure Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. Consider the following instance.
a b c d e f
Agent 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Agent 2 1 0 1 0 1 1
Agent 3 1 1 0 1 0 1
Running the BALANCED LIKE mechanism, one always ob-
tains an allocation with egalitarian welfare 1, except when the
items are allocated to the agents according to the sequence of
agents (2, 1, 1, 3, 2, 3), in which case the egalitarian welfare
is 2. By analysing the allocation tree of the BALANCED LIKE
mechanism, one can see that the instance has a unique simple
pure Nash equilibrium, which favours this allocation.
a b c d e f
Agent 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Agent 2 1 0 1 0 1 1
Agent 3 1 1 0 1 0 1
We obtain an expected utilitarian utility of 13/12 for sincere
play and 9/8 for the simple pure Nash equilibrium. 2
6 Fairness
How fair are these mechanisms? Is the BALANCED LIKE
mechanism more fair in some sense than the LIKE mech-
anism. Since the outcome of our mechanisms are random,
we consider fairness notions both ex post (with respect to the
actual allocation achieved in a particular world) and ex ante
(with respect to the expected utility over all possible worlds).
One notion of fairness commonly considered in the fair divi-
sion literature is envy freeness [Brams and Taylor, 1996]. An
agent envies ex post another agent if their utility of the other
agent’s allocation is greater than the utility of their alloca-
tion. Similarly, an agent envies ex ante another agent if their
expected utility of the other agent’s allocation is greater than
their expected utility of their allocation. A mechanism is envy
free ex post/ex ante if no agent envies another ex post/ex ante.
We also consider a weaker notion. An agent has bounded envy
ex post of another agent if there exists a constant r such that
in every case their utility of the other agent’s allocation is at
most r greater than their utility of their allocation. Similarly,
an agent has bounded envy ex ante of another agent if there
exists a constant r such that their expected utility of the other
agent’s allocation is at most r greater than their expected util-
ity of their allocation. We say that a mechanism is bounded
envy free ex post/ex ante if each agent has bounded envy ex
post/ex ante of every other agent.
If a mechanism is envy free ex post/ex ante then it is
bounded envy free ex post/ex ante, whilst if a mechanism is
(bounded) envy free ex post then it is (bounded) envy free
ex ante. It is easy to show that no mechanism for indivisible
items that allocates all items can be envy free ex post: sup-
pose we have one indivisible item and two or more agents
who value it. Regarding the other envy free properties, we
prove the following results.
Theorem 7 Supposing agents act sincerely then the LIKE
mechanism is envy free ex ante. It is not bounded envy free
ex post, even with 0/1 utilities and 2 agents.
Proof. To prove envy freeness ex ante, we perform induction
over the number of items. In the base case, we have no items
to allocate, each agent receives an expected utility of 0, and
no agent envies another ex ante. For the induction step, we
suppose the allocation of the first m− 1 items is envy free ex
ante, and consider the mth item which is allocated. Suppose
j (≤ k) agents have non-zero utility for the mth item. Then
each agent receives this item in 1j of the possible worlds. This
means that the new allocation remains envy free ex ante.
To show that the LIKE mechanism is not bounded envy free
ex post even with 0/1 utilities, suppose 2 agents have utility 1
for all m items. There is one outcome in which the first agent
gets lucky and is assigned every item. However, in this case,
the other agent assigns a utility m greater to the first agent’s
allocation than to their own (empty) allocation. 2
As the LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof, it seems reason-
able to suppose agents act sincerely. By comparison, when
limited to 0/1 utilities, the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is
both envy free ex ante, and bounded envy free ex post.
Theorem 8 Supposing agents act sincerely and all utilities
are 0 or 1, the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is envy free ex
ante and bounded envy free ex post.
Proof sketch. Both proofs use induction on the number of
items. For envy freeness ex ante, the induction step uses case
analysis to show that the expected increase in utility for an
agent is at least as large as their expected increase in utility for
the allocation of any other agent. For bounded envy freeness
ex post, the induction step again uses case analysis to show
that the envy is at most 1 unit. 2
It is not hard to show that with general utilities, the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism is no longer envy free ex ante,
or bounded envy free ex post (or even, ex ante). Balancing
the allocation of items may prevent an agent who values an
item greatly from being allocated it.
Example 2 Consider 2 agents and 2 items, a and b. Suppose
agent 1 has utility 0 for a and p for b, but agent 2 has utility
1 for item a and p − 1 for item b where p > 2. Note that
both agents have the same sum of utilities for the two items.
If agents bid sincerely then agent 2 gets an expected utility
of just 1 and envies ex ante agent 1’s allocation which gives
agent 2 an expected utility of p− 1. As p is unbounded, agent
2 does not have bounded envy ex post or ex ante of agent 1.
To conclude, on the basis of envy freeness, provided
utilities are 0/1 (or close to this), we might consider the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism to be somewhat more fair
than the LIKE mechanism. On the other hand, when util-
ities are not 0/1 (or close to this), we might consider the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism to be somewhat less fair than
the LIKE mechanism.
7 Competitive analysis
A powerful technique to study online mechanisms is compet-
itive analysis [Sleator and Tarjan, 1985]. This identifies the
loss in efficiency due to the data arriving in an online fash-
ion. We say that a randomized mechanism M for online fair
division is c-competitive from an egalitarian/utilitarian per-
spective iff there exists a constant a such that whatever the
input sequence of items pi:
SWOPT (pi) ≤ c · E[SWM (pi)] + a
where E[SWM (pi)] is the expected egalitarian/utilitarian so-
cial welfare of the mechanism on pi, and SWOPT (pi) is the
optimal egalitarian/utilitarian social welfare of an (offline) as-
signment. We suppose agents bid sincerely. In the next sec-
tion, we consider the price of anarchy, which is essentially
the competitive ratio when agents bid strategically. The fol-
lowing results hold irrespective of the model of the adversary
(oblivious, or adaptive offline).
The LIKE mechanism is competitive when the number of
agents is bounded, even with general utilities.
Theorem 9 With k agents, the LIKE mechanism is k-
competitive from an egalitarian or utilitarian perspective.
Proof. With the LIKE mechanism, the worst case for every
agent is that every other agent bids against them. Hence, the
worst case is that their expected social welfare is 1k the small-
est sum of utilities. By comparison, the best case for an agent
is that they receive the sum of their utilities. Hence, the com-
petitive ratio from an egalitarian or utilitarian perspective is
at worst k. From an egalitarian perspective, this bound is
met even when utilities are just 0 or 1. Consider k2 items
being divided between k agents. The first agent has utility
of 1 for the first k items and 0 for all remaining items. The
other agents have utility 1 for all items. The optimal offline
allocation achieves egalitarian social welfare of k units, but
expected egalitarian social welfare of the LIKE mechanism is
just 1 unit. From a utilitarian perspective, this bound is met
even with just k items. Suppose the ith agent has an utility of
1− (k− 1) for the ith item, and  for all other items where 
is a small non-zero constant. Note that the sum of the utilities
for any agent is normalized to 1 unit. The optimal utilitar-
ian offline allocation a social welfare of k units as  goes to
zero, whilst the expected utilitarian social welfare of the LIKE
mechanism is just 1 unit. 2
On the other hand, the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not
competitive even with just 2 agents.
Theorem 10 With general utilities and 2 agents, the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not c-competitive from an
egalitarian or utilitarian perspective for any constant c.
Proof. Consider the fair division of 4 items with the follow-
ing utilities, where  > 0 is a small positive constant.
a b c d
Agent 1  1− 2 0 
Agent 2 0   1− 2
Note that the sum of the utilities for any agent is normalized
to 1 unit. Then the optimal egalitarian (utilitarian) offline al-
location gives items 1 and 2 to the first agent and items 3 and
4 to the second agent. This has an egalitarian (utilitarian) so-
cial welfare of 1−  unit (2−  units). On the other hand, the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism results in an egalitarian (utili-
tarian) social welfare of just 2 (4), allocating items 1 and 4
to agent 1 and the other two items to agent 2. 2
Finally, when restricted to 0/1 utilities, every allocation of
the LIKE or BALANCED LIKE mechanism achieves the utili-
tarian social welfare of the optimal offline allocation. The is
because items only go to agents that value them.
8 Price of anarchy
The price of anarchy is closely related to the competitive ra-
tio but also takes into account agents acting strategically. The
price of anarchy measures how the efficiency of a decentral-
ized system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents
compared to imposing a centralized solution based on sin-
cere preferences [Papadimitriou, 2001]. From an egalitarian
(utilitarian) perspective, the price of anarchy of an online fair
division mechanism is the ratio between the optimal egali-
tarian (utilitarian) social welfare, and the smallest egalitarian
(utilitarian) social welfare of any equilibrium strategy. We
consider simple pure Nash equilibria (defined in Section 5).
Theorem 11 With k agents, the price of anarchy of the LIKE
mechanism is k for egalitarian welfare, and for utilitarian
welfare it is at most k and greater than k −  for any  > 0.
Proof. Note that we consider general utilities, and the LIKE
mechanism is not strategy-proof in this case. Consider the
equilibrium strategy with least expected egalitarian (utilitar-
ian) social welfare. Suppose an agent bids for an item with
non-zero utility. The worst case is when every other agent
bids against them. This gives an expected utility which is 1k
of the sum of their utilities. By comparison, the best case is
that they receive the sum of their utilities.
From an egalitarian perspective, this bound is achieved
when k2 items are divided between k agents, the first agent
has utility 1 for the first k items, zero for the rest, and every
other agent has utility 1 for every item. Then it is a dominant
strategy for the first agent to bid for the first k items, and for
all other agents to bid for every item. This gives an expected
egalitarian social welfare of 1, compared to the optimal egal-
itarian social welfare of k units.
For the utilitarian case, select ′ such that 0 < ′ <

k·(k−1) . The bound is achieved when k items are divided be-
tween k agents, the ith agent has utility 1− (k − 1)′ for the
ith item and ′ for the rest. The dominant strategy is for every
agent to bid for every item. In this case, the optimal utilitarian
social welfare is k ·(1−(k−1)·′) > k ·(1− (k−1)·k·(k−1) ) = k−
whilst the expected utilitarian social welfare of the LIKE
mechanism is 1. 2
For the BALANCED LIKE mechanism, we have the follow-
ing lower bounds on the price of anarchy.
Theorem 12 With 0/1 utilities and k agents, the price of an-
archy of the BALANCED LIKE mechanism from an egalitar-
ian perspective is at least k.
Proof. Consider k2 items being divided between k agents.
The first agent has utility 1 for the first k items and 0 for
all remaining items. The other agents have utility 1 for all
items. The optimal egalitarian offline allocation gives the
first k items to the first agent, and k of the other items to
each of the other agents. This has an egalitarian social wel-
fare of k units. On the other hand, a dominant strategy with
the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is sincerity. This gives an
expected egalitarian social welfare of 1. 2
Theorem 13 With general utilities and k agents, the price of
anarchy of the BALANCED LIKE mechanism from a utilitar-
ian perspective is greater than k − , for any  > 0.
Proof. Consider an instance with k items. Select ′ such that
0 < ′ < k·(k−1) . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, agent i has utility
1−(k−1)·′ for item i and utility ′ for all other items. In the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism, sincere play is the dominant
strategy, allocating one item to each agent. The probability
that agent i receives item i is k−1k · k−2k−1 · . . . 1k−i+1 = 1/k.
Thus, the expected utilitarian welfare is 1− (k−1) · ′+(k−
1) · ′ = 1. The optimal offline strategy simply allocates item
i to agent i, for an utilitarian welfare of k · (1− (k−1) · ′) >
k · (1− (k−1)·k·(k−1) ) = k − . 2
Finally, with 0/1 utilities and either mechanism, it is a dom-
inant strategy for agents only to bid for (a subset of) the items
for which they have utility. Hence, both mechanisms achieve
the optimal utilitarian social welfare. Thus, there is no price
of anarchy from an utilitarian perspective in these cases.
9 Experiments
To determine the impact on social welfare of these mech-
anisms and to determine if BALANCED LIKE outperforms
LIKE in practice, we ran some experiments. We used a wide
range of problem instances: random 0/1 utilities, random
Borda utilities, correlated 0/1 and Borda utilities generated
with the Po´lya-Eggenberger model, as well as 0/1 and Borda
utilities from PrefLib.org [Mattei and Walsh, 2013]. For rea-
sons of space, we report here just results with random 0/1
utilities. We observed similar trends with the other classes.
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Figure 1: Egalitarian price of anarchy, and competitive ratio
of BALANCED LIKE and LIKE mechanisms. (left) varying
items for 5 agents, (right) varying agents for 10 items.
We varied the number of agents from 2 to 5, and the num-
ber of items from 2 to 10. We sampled 100 instances at each
data point, computing the optimal (offline) allocation, and all
simple pure Nash equilibria by brute force. In Figure 1, we
plot (1) the competitive ratios (“like” and “balanced”), (2) the
prices of anarchy (“balanced-”) and (3) the ratio between the
egalitarian welfare of the best simple pure Nash equilibrium
and the optimal allocation (“balanced+”). As these are ratios,
we plot geometric means. Arithmetic means are similar. We
note that the BALANCED LIKE mechanism (“balanced”) im-
proves the egalitarian welfare compared to the LIKE mecha-
nism (“like”) supposing sincere or strategic play of the agents.
Indeed, strategic play of the agents often increases social wel-
fare even in the worst case (“balanced-” compared to “bal-
anced”), though the effect is small. With Borda utilities,
strategic play is less helpful and can result in lower social
welfare. Nevertheless, BALANCED LIKE remained superior
in all our experiments to the LIKE mechanism.
10 Related work
There is a large literature on the fair division of divisible
and indivisible goods. Almost all studies assume that all the
goods are present initially. There are, however, a few excep-
tions. Walsh [2011] has proposed an online model of cake
cutting. However, in this model the agents arrive over time
(not the items), and the goods are divisible (not indivisible).
Kash, Procaccia and Shah [2014] have proposed a related
model in which agents again arrive over time, but there are
now multiple, homogeneous divisible goods (and not a single
LIKE mechanism BALANCED LIKE mechanism
strategy-proof X ×,X for k=2 & 0/1 utilities
envy free (ex ante) X ×,X for 0/1 utilities
bound envy free (ex post) × even for ×,X for 0/1 utilities
k = 2 & 0/1 utilities
competitive X × even for k=2
price of anarchy (e) k ≥ k
price of anarchy (u) k, 1 for 0/1 utilities ≥ k, 1 for 0/1 utilities
Table 1: Overview of results for k agents. (e) = egalitarian,
(u) = utilitarian.
heterogeneous divisible good as in [Walsh, 2011], or multi-
ple, heterogeneous indivisible goods as here). Bounded envy
freeness is closely related to the “single-unit utility differ-
ence” property that Budish, Che, Kojima and Milgrom [2013]
prove can be achieved in offline fair division with any ran-
domized allocation mechanism that is envy free ex ante.
The LIKE and BALANCED LIKE mechanisms take an item-
centric view of allocation. They iterate over the items, al-
locating them in turn to agents. By comparison, there are
agent-centric mechanisms like the sequential allocation pro-
cedure which iterate over the agents, allocating items to them
in turn [Brams and Taylor, 1999]. These mechanisms have
attracted considerable attention in the AI literature recently
(e.g. [Bouveret and Lang, 2011; Kalinowski et al., 2013;
Kalinowski et al., 2013]). As our matching problem is one-
sided (agents have preferences over items, but not vice-versa),
we cannot immediately map results from there to here. There
are also randomized mechanisms like random serial dictator
[Zhou, 1990], and the probabilistic serial mechanism [Bogo-
molnaia and Moulin, 2001] which again take an agent-centric
view of allocation. It would be interesting future work to con-
sider how such agent-centric mechanisms could be modified
to work with online fair division problems.
11 Conclusions
Motivated by our work with a local Food Bank charity, we
have studied a simple online model of fair division, as well
as two simple mechanisms for this problem. To help de-
cide what mechanism to use in practice, we have studied
the axiomatic properties of these mechanisms like strategy-
proofness and envy-freeness. In addition, we have undertaken
a competitive analysis, and computed their price of anarchy.
A summary of our results is given in Table 1.
One possible take home message from this table is that we
might consider the BALANCED LIKE mechanism if the items
can be packaged together so that agents have similar util-
ity for all packages, and that we should otherwise prefer the
LIKE mechanism when this is not possible. In future work,
we plan to take into account other important features of this
real world allocation problem. For example, as the charities
have different abilities to feed their clients, we need a model
of online fair division in which the agents have different enti-
tlements. Our mechanisms can be easily adapted to take this
feature into account. We will need to consider the impact this
has on axiomatic properties like strategy-proofness and fair-
ness. We will then be in a position to implement and field a
mechanism for online fair division in the field.
References
[Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] A. Bogomolnaia and
H. Moulin. A new solution to the random assignment
problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):295 – 328,
2001.
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011] S. Bouveret and J. Lang. A
general elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible
goods. In Toby Walsh, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ-
CAI 2011), pages 73–78. IJCAI/AAAI, 2011.
[Brams and Taylor, 1996] S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. Fair
Division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
[Brams and Taylor, 1999] S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. The
Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Every-
body. Norton, New York and London, 1999.
[Budish et al., 2013] E. Budish, Y.-K. Che, F. Kojima, and
P. Milgrom. Designing random allocation mechanisms:
Theory and applications. American Economic Review,
103(2):585–623, 2013.
[Chevaleyre et al., 2006] Y. Chevaleyre, P.E. Dunne, U. En-
driss, J. Lang, M. Lemaitre, N. Maudet, J.A. Padget,
S. Phelps, J.A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, and P. Sousa. Issues
in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica (Slovenia),
30(1):3–31, 2006.
[Davidson, 2012] P. Davidson. Poverty in Australia. 2012.
ISBN 978085871082.
[Kalinowski et al., 2013] T. Kalinowski, N. Narodytska,
T. Walsh, and L. Xia. Strategic behavior when allocat-
ing indivisible goods sequentially. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI 2013). AAAI Press, 2013.
[Kash et al., 2014] I. Kash, A.D. Procaccia, and N. Shah.
No agent left behind: Dynamic fair division of multi-
ple resources. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
51:579–603, 2014.
[Mattei and Walsh, 2013] N. Mattei and T. Walsh. PrefLib:
A library of preference data. In Algorithmic Decision The-
ory, Third International Conference, (ADT 2013), Lecture
Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Springer, 2013.
[Papadimitriou, 2001] C.H. Papadimitriou. Algorithms,
games, and the internet. In Proceedings on 33rd Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 749–
753, 2001.
[Sleator and Tarjan, 1985] D.D. Sleator and R.E. Tarjan.
Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules. Com-
munications of the ACM, 28(2):202–208, February 1985.
[Walsh, 2011] T. Walsh. Online cake cutting. In Algorithmic
Decision Theory, Second International Conference, ADT
2011. Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer, 2011.
[Walsh, 2014] T. Walsh. Allocation in practice. In Proceed-
ings of 37th German Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(KI-2014), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages
13–24. Springer, 2014.
[Walsh, 2015] T. Walsh. Challenges in resource and cost al-
location. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on
AI. Association for Advancement of Artificial Intelligence,
2015.
[Zhou, 1990] L. Zhou. On a conjecture by Gale about one-
sided matching problems. Journal of Economic Theory,
52(1):123 – 135, 1990.
